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INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on interlocutory appeal. This is a personal injury
action commenced by plaintiffs, who were severely injured in a collision when
defendant's engine pulled in front of them without sounding a statutorily required
warning. The district court correctly denied defendant's Motion to Dismiss on the basis
that plaintiffs strictly complied with the Governmental Immunity Act in delivering a
notice of claim to the attorney general prior to filing suit. The trial court therefore
properly determined as a matter of fact and law that it had jurisdiction over the case.
JURISDICTION
Plaintiffs agree that the Court has jurisdiction as set forth in defendant's brief.
(Brief of Appellant at iii).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Plaintiffs are dissatisfied with the statement of the issues contained in the Brief of
Appellant. The issues and the standard of review in this case are incorrectly stated. The
correct issues are:
1. Did the trial court properly find as a matter of fact that the attorney general has
an office in the Heber M. Wells Building thus rendering service of the notice of claim on
him there proper?

Standard of Review:
Where a factual determination underpins a decision on a motion to dismiss, the
appellate court will accept the factual determination unless it is clearly erroneous.
Thompson v. County of Franklin, 15 F.3d 245, 249 (2nd Cir. 1994); M.D. Physicians and
Assocs. v. State Board of Insurance, 957 F.2d 178, 181 (5th Cir. 1992); See, Griffith v.
Griffith, 985 P.2d 255, 258 (Utah 1999) (standard of review for factual determinations
underlying rulings on motions is clearly erroneous standard.) Plaintiffs agree that a trial
court's conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness.
2. Is a claim against the Heber Valley Railroad Authority exempt from the
Governmental Immunity Act notice requirement because by statute such a claim is not
based on liability of the State or a political subdivision?
Standard of Review:
This Court determines interpretation of language in statutes under a correctness
standard and makes its own legal conclusions. State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 858-59
(Utah 1995).
STATUTES OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE
In addition to the statute cited in the Brief of Appellee, the following statutes
are also of central importance:

2

Utah Code Annotated Section 68-3-8.5 reads in relevant pail.
(1) As used in this section:

{0} tvcport11 niuiua a report, claim, tax
reium, sfatenirnf or other document:
«? i | a) A report or payment required or authorized to
be filed or made to the state of Utah, or Lo any
political subdivision of Utah, that is transmitted
through the United States mail is considered to be
filed or made and received by the state or political
subdivisions on the date shown on the post office
rmcellation mark stamped upon the em elope or
ilm r appropriate wrapper containing it.
Utah Code Annotated Section OJ-JU-2 pro\ ides m :*'levant part;
(1) "Claim" means any claim or cause of action for
money or damages against a governmental entity or
against an employee.

(3) "Governmental entity" means the state and its
political subdivisions as defined in this chapter.
Utah Code Annotated Section 9-3-307 provides*
(1) An obligation oi Iiabilit) ol the [llebcr Valley
Railroad] authority does not constitute a debt or
liability of this state or of any of its political
subdivisions nor does any obligation or liability
constitute the loaning of credit of the state or of am of
its political subdivisions nor may any obligation *-•*
liability of the authority be payable from funds other
than those of the authority. All obligations of the
3

authority shall contain a statement to the effect that the
authority is obligated to pay them solely from the
revenues or other funds of the authority and that this
state or its political subdivisions are not obligated to
pay them and that neither the faith and credit nor the
taxing power of this state or any of its political
subdivisions is pledged to the payment of them.
(2) All expenses incurred in carrying out this part shall
be payable solely from funds of the authority provided
under this part, and nothing in this part may be
construed to authorize the authority to incur
indebtedness or liability on behalf of or payable by this
state or any of its political subdivisions.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On June 19, 2001, plaintiffs mailed a notice of claim addressed as follows:
Attorney General
State of Utah
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0873
(R. 24). The claim was denied about seventy-five days later (R. 43). Plaintiffs filed their
complaint on November 30, 2001 (R. 1).
Defendant moved to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint on the ground that the
attorney general was not properly noticed (R. 29). The "factual" basis for its motion was
solely the unsworn averment of counsel in her memorandum of points and authorities
that the attorney general's office is located at the State Capitol and not where the notice of
claim was mailed, the Heber Wells Building at 160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor, Salt Lake
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(

.-

Ll c o u n s e j s t a t e c | 'ls o n | y a

division office (R. „ u & fn *), Mailing was a proper

form of service. (Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-8.5.>
Plaintiffs responded with admissiD; a-. .Liiiicniai> i ' itlcn
letterhet^ . .

,

• ^•

mliii'jnffii

- .in .in I dress of 160 East 300

Snnili hfth H, Hir s.ilt 1 akc City, I Ifali (R. 40-47). His predecessor, Jan Graham, had •'
official letterhead listing "Jan Graham, Attorney General," at the same address, 160 East'
300 South, Fifth Floor, Salt Lake City, I -uiu \ JV. n r , .

hansel rece/v.
* •! • .J. Tiaue no

letterhead whicii coMai;. ..

^ •

referJJ . •

Ruildin? being merely a division oiilce tjK. 4o~4 v

- '

•

The Utah Attorney General's official web page at the Utah State Government
Home Page lists him as having two offices, one at the Utah State Capitol and one at
HeberM.. Wells Building (K. .)(>• i > i I Uv guicial oliice unmix r s ' -n c listed mi ihr wvb
page v iv >'i

iiiiiiu en liisl nfllir nmiilin Ir.Kd 166 0100,, rings to the Heber Wells

r v r . v Ruildn • ir;,; ^-- receptionist answering the line says, "Attorney General's Office"
(R. 32).
The directory in the M-» !•_. i ,, ,.
Genera >, U:L.
.<v

t

v

^ us JtJuua::: r ..

.••;•*•
•

~

t 0 t|ie

>*

-

- T a i v nher

Attorney General in the singular (R. 44, 7 i). (The

cover page of defendant's opening brief also lists the Heber Wells Building as Mr.
Shurtleff s address.)
5

After hearing argument on defendant's motion, the trial court found in
accordance with plaintiffs' pleadings and exhibits that the evidence conclusively
established that the attorney general has an office in the Heber Wells Building even
though he also has one in the State Capitol (R. 73. See also R. 31-37; 43-48). Plaintiffs
therefore strictly complied with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act notice
requirements (id).1 Based on these facts, the trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss
(id.).
This Court granted plaintiffs' Petition for Interlocutory Appeal on April 17,
2002. Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Disposition on which this Court by order
dated May 14, 2002 deferred its decision pending plenary briefing.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Plaintiffs agree that the facts relevant to the issues are the procedural facts
stated above.

1

There is no foundation in the record for the defendant's statement that the trial
court determined 1) the case would not be dismissed on a technicality; and 2) because the
statute does not name the attorney general specifically, sending a notice of claim to a
division within the Attorney General's Office constitutes compliance with the Immunity
Act. (Brief of Appellees at v.) In fact, defendant fails to cite to the record in making this
statement. (Id.) Accordingly, defendant's statement of the case in this regard is improper
and wrong.
6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant never disputed plaintiffs' documentary and other evidence
demonstrating that the attorney general in official documents lists his office at the Heber
Wells Building at 160 East 300 South. In fact, defendant presented no evidence contrary
to these facts. Defendant merely made an averment in its motion to dismiss pleading that
the attorney general's office is at the State Capitol Building and not in the Heber Wells
Building. Accordingly, the trial court's finding that the attorney general had an office at
the Heber Wells Building and plaintiffs strictly complied with the Immunity Act is a
factual finding supported by substantial if not exclusive evidence which finding should
not be disturbed on appeal.
Assuming for the sake of argument that there was not strict compliance, the
attorney general held himself out in official documents as having an office at the Heber
Wells Building. This representation would place this case squarely within the rule
estopping governmental entities from presenting a jurisdictional defense of improper
notice of a claim.
Finally, again assuming for the sake of argument that there was not strict
compliance, the organic statute creating the Heber Valley Historic Railroad Authority
states that claims made against the authority are not claims against the State. Defendant
is therefore exempt from the Governmental Immunity Act notice provisions. Defendant
is precluded from incurring liability on behalf of the State of Utah.
7

ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND PLAINTIFF'S
NOTICE STRICTLY COMPLIED WITH THE
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT.
A.

The Trial Court's Unopposed Factual Finding That the
Attorney General Has an Office in the Heber Wells
Building Was Not Clearly Erroneous and Should Not Be
Disturbed on Appeal.

As noted above, the trial court found plaintiffs strictly complied with the
Governmental Immunity Act notice requirements (see Statement of the Case, ante, at 56.) The court correctly determined plaintiffs met the strict compliance standard
enunciated in, e.g., Brown v. Transit Authority, 2002 UT 15 f 4, 40 P.3d 638 and Greene
v. Utah Transit Authority, 2001 UT 109,% 12, 37 P.3d. 1156. (See also, Thimmes v. Utah
State University, 2001 UT App. 93, ^ 7, 22 P.3d. 257. See R. 73; R. 31-37; 43-48.)
The trial court based its finding on undisputed facts that the attorney general
has an office in the Heber Wells building and can be served there. Since this finding was
not clearly erroneous, it should not be disturbed on appeal. (Department of Human
Services ex rel Parker v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 678 (Utah 1997).) "[W]hile in
reviewing a mixed finding of fact and law appellate 'courts are free to make an
independent determination of the trial court's conclusions,' . . . the trial court's factual
finding shall not be set aside on appeal unless clearly erroneous." Id. citing State v. Tyler,
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850 P.2d 1250, 1253 (Utah 1993) (quoting State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah
1990).).
The district court found and the record establishes without contradiction that
the attorney general unambiguously identified his Heber Wells offices as his offices, not
as some branch office, on his letterhead, on his official web page and on his sign (R. 3637, 44, 46-47, 71). In fact, the Brief of Appellant does the same thing on its cover page.
Plaintiffs therefore strictly complied with the notice provisions of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act by sending a claim to where the evidence showed the attorney general had
an office - the Heber Wells Building address.
Defendant presented no facts in opposition to this finding but merely made an
unsupported statement in its memorandum that the attorney general had offices in the
Capitol. (R. 19 & fh. 1.) Plaintiffs are aware of no statutes or regulations designating the
State Capitol as the attorney general's only office. Given the overwhelming evidence
supporting jurisdiction, the trial court's decision that it had power to hear the case was not
clearly erroneous. The court therefore correctly concluded that plaintiffs strictly
complied with the notice provisions of Utah Code Annotated, § 63-30-11.2
2

The terms "attorney general" in the statute are not capitalized. This raises an
interesting issue of whether the legislature intended that a notice of claim be directed to
"the Attorney General" as a person or merely to the attorney general as a state agency or
office. The Utah Constitution in designating the "Attorney General" uses initial capital
letters to describe the person holding the office. Utah Const. Art. VII, sections 16 and 18.
As a matter of style, titles of persons are capitalized (GPO Style Manual, Section 3.36, a
Uniform System of Citation, 16th Edition, Section 6.2 "Capitalization." (Also known as
9

B.

Even If There Were Not Strict Compliance with the Notice
Provision (And There Was) Defendant Is Estopped from Denying
Proper Notice Because of Specific, Official Representations That
He Has an Office in the Heber Wells Building.

Assuming for the sake of argument that there was not strict compliance with
the Immunity Act, defendant is estopped from raising the issue. This Court recently
affirmed that even though the Immunity Act requires strict compliance, a governmental
entity can be estopped from asserting insufficiency of notice of claim as a jurisdictional
defense where its statements "mislead plaintiffs into filing a notice of claim incorrectly."
(Wheeler v. McPherson, 2002 UT 16fflf17-18, 40 P.3d. 632.) The government can be
estopped when there are "very specific written representations by authorized government
entities." Anderson v. Public Service Commission, 839 P.2d 822, 827 (Utah 1992). This
exception to the general rule against estopping governmental entities applies 'where it is
plain that the ends of justice so require."5 (Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Board, 795
P.2d. 671, 675 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting Utah State University v. Stro & Co., 646
P.2d, 715, 720 (Utah 1982)). See Thimmes, supra at ^ 8.)
In this case, the explicit written representations of the attorney general in
publications to the public at large and in specific correspondence on his letterhead (and in
his brief in this case) all showed the Heber Wells Building as his address. These

the "Bluebook.") The lack of capitalization in the statute thus indicates that as long as the
notice is directed to an attorney general office rather than to the sitting Attorney General,
it is valid. However, that need not be decided in this case because the notice was directed
and delivered to the "Attorney General."
10

documents certainly satisfy the elements of estoppel as a matter of law. It would be
reasonable for anyone to rely upon his written definitions of where his address is. The
plain ends of justice would require estoppel because if plaintiffs' claims were dismissed
they would have no remedy for their injuries.
II.
DEFENDANT HAD NO STANDING TO MOVE TO DISMISS
THE MOTION BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM WAS NOT A
CLAIM AGAINST THE STATE OF UTAH WITHIN THE
MEANING OF THE IMMUNITY ACT.3
Again assuming arguendo that there was not strict compliance with the
Immunity Act's notice requirement, defendant is not entitled to a jurisdictional defense.
The Immunity Act applies only to claims against a "governmental entity" meaning "the
state and its political subdivisions." (Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(l)-(3).) Defendant
Heber Valley Historic Railroad Authority's enabling act, on the other hand, contains a
section which prohibits defendant from incurring liability on behalf of or payable by the
State of Utah or any of its political subdivisions.
The statute in question which provides in relevant part:
(1) An obligation or liability of the authority does not
constitute a debt or liability of this state or of any of its
political subdivisions... nor may any obligation or
liability of the authority be payable from funds other
than those of the authority.

3

The trial court did not reach this argument because it denied the motion to dismiss on
factual grounds.
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(2) All expenses incurred in carrying out this part shall
be payable solely from funds of the authority provided
under this part, and nothing in this part may be
construed to authorize the authority to incur
indebtedness or liability on behalf of or payable by this
state or any of its political subdivisions.
Utah Code Annotated § 9-3-307 (emphasis added).
There is no authority construing this statute. However, when given its plain
meaning {Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984)), the
statute makes the Governmental Immunity Act inapplicable in this case since claims
against the Heber Valley Railroad Authority cannot be for "liability on behalf of or
payable by this state or any its political subdivisions." (Utah Code Ann. § 9-3-307(2).)
Thus, a claim against defendant is not an "action for damages" against a "governmental
entity" within the meaning of the Immunity Act under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(1).
This is because "governmental entity" means "the state and its political subdivisions"
{id.) and the Heber Valley Railroad's liability "does not constitute a debt or liability of
this state or of any of its political subdivisions." (Utah Code Ann. §9-3-307(1).)
Defendant's motion to dismiss is therefore unsustainable. Defendant is not be immune
from suit but is liable for its obligations from its own assets as if a private entity.
CONCLUSION
Based on the undisputed facts, on statute and on case law, this Court should
summarily dismiss the appeal having deferred ruling on plaintiffs Motion for Summary
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Disposition. If plenary review is warranted, the Court should affirm the order of the
district court denying the motion to dismiss and award costs to plaintiffs.
DATED this

// day of July, 2002.
KIRTON & McCONKIE

Samuel D. McVey
Lorin C. Barker
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees
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